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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 8102: Discretion exercised in allowing costs in county court
action.
CPLR 8102(3) disallows the disbursement of costs to a plaintiff
when an action brought in a county court could have been brought, ex-
cept for the amount claimed, in a court of lesser jurisdiction, unless he
recovers $250 or more in the county court. The purpose of this limita-
tion is to relieve the congestion and expense occasioned by prosecution
of small claims in higher courts. 250 Recently, in Fusco v. Roberts,251 a
motion for disallowance of costs was denied where, although the re-
covery was below $250, the court found that the purpose of the statute
had not been infringed.
Relevant to this determination was the presence of joint plaintiffs:
an infant suing for personal injury and an adult suing for property
damage. Since both claims arose from the same automobile accident,
common issues were involved. Nevertheless, the infant was adjudged
to have no cause of action, and the adult recovered only $200.
On the basis of these facts, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs
were justified in joining their actions and suing in the county court
particularly because the injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff were
serious. And, by joining their claims, the plantiffs had, in fact, relieved
court congestion.
Although the Fusco decision is a well-reasoned one, the language
of CPLR 8102(3) does not appear to sanction the discretion exercised
by the court in allowing costs. Indeed, the section is purposely designed
to encourage foresight by an attorney,252 rather than hindsight by a
court. Admittedly, the section's value as a deterrent is questionable.253
However, reading discretion into the section could render it totally
meaningless. And, repeal of the section should be legislative - not
judicial.254
250 FOURTH REP. 304.
251 62 Misc. 2d 624, 309 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Nassau County Ct. 1970).
252 FouRTH REP. 304.
253 [T]he devices that have been effective in moving cases into the lower courts are
the stringent calendar-preference rules and the transfer provisions .... Keeping a
large differential in fees between the courts and reducing the delay in the lower
court.. . are more effective than the sanction imposed by CPLR 8102.
8 WK&-M 8102.01, at 81-41.
254 The Advisory Committee recommended further study in light of court reorga-
nization, the efficacy of the rule, and an analysis of the administrative needs of each
court. Founn REP. 304. Hence, legislative action should be forthcoming.
